Ledger no longer safe?
Description
If you own one of these devices, which is a ledger nano X you need to pay attention to what's happening right now with Ledger Recovery because it's being revealed that ledger products may not be as ...
AI Analysis
If you own a Ledger Nano X or use Ledger products, you need to pay close attention to the recent revelations about Ledger Recover. This new service has challenged the fundamental assumption that your private key – the one holding all your cryptocurrencies – would never leave your device. The discovery that the key can leave the device, even with your permission, has deeply upset the crypto community, as it contradicts the core reason many people chose Ledger for security.
Here's a breakdown of the situation and what it means:
* The Core Problem: Keys Can Leave Your Device
The primary reason people bought Ledger devices was the absolute assurance that the private key, which secures your cryptocurrencies, would never* leave the device.
* The new Ledger Recover service fundamentally changes this. It allows the private key to be fragmented and leave the device, albeit requiring user permission and multiple steps.
* This has caused widespread concern and anger within the community because it feels like a betrayal of Ledger's initial promise and the core security model of their hardware wallets.
The problem isn't just that the key can* leave, but that this capability seems to have been "baked in" to the Ledger hardware from the beginning, implying features were present that users weren't initially told about. This raises questions about transparency and trust, especially since the secure module is closed-source, meaning we can't inspect the code ourselves.
* What is Ledger Recover?
* Ledger Recover is a new service specifically designed to help users restore access to their Ledger Nano X device in situations where they've lost their recovery phrase, the device is damaged, or in grim circumstances like the user passing away.
* It works by having the Ledger device split your private key into three encrypted "shards" (fragments) within its secure enclave – the most secure part of the chip.
* These three encrypted shards are then sent to three independent, trusted third-party custodians.
* To restore your access, you need to provide your identity (like a passport or face scan) to these third parties. If two out of the three custodians confirm your identity, they will release their respective shards.
* These two shards are then used to cryptographically reconstruct your private key and restore access to your funds. This process is called "shamir secret sharing" and is generally considered cryptographically safe.
* The process is supposedly opt-in, meaning you have to explicitly confirm the operation on your Ledger screen, which theoretically prevents hackers from activating it without your direct approval. Ledger's management likely saw this as a convenient and secure recovery feature for users.
* Major Security Concerns and Controversies
Broken Trust: The most significant issue is the erosion of trust. Users bought Ledgers believing the private key would never* leave the device. The existence of Ledger Recover, and the implied pre-existing hardware capability, makes people feel misled.
* Keys Leaving the Device: The core principle of hardware wallets is "not your keys, not your crypto." When keys can leave the device, even in fragments, it goes against this principle. While signed transactions leave the device, the signing key itself was never supposed to.
* Closed-Source Module: Ledger's secure element is closed-source, meaning its code isn't publicly auditable. This forces users to trust Ledger completely. The revelation of the "baked-in" recovery feature amplifies concerns about what other hidden functionalities might exist.
* Social Engineering Risk: While the sharding process itself might be cryptographically sound, the human element introduces risk. Hackers could potentially use sophisticated social engineering tactics or deepfakes to trick the third-party custodians into releasing the shards, impersonating the legitimate owner.
New Attack Vectors: The existence of a mechanism for the key to leave the device means hackers can now focus on understanding how* this process works. If they can figure out the mechanics of how the key is broken down and sent, they might discover new vulnerabilities to exploit, making the device less secure overall, even for those who don't opt into the service.
* What I'm Doing About It (And My Take)
* I will never opt into or use the Ledger Recover feature. I don't see losing a Ledger device as a major risk, as I own multiple hardware wallets.
* I am actively migrating my Bitcoin and Ethereum holdings from my Ledger Nano X to a Trezor device. This is a gradual process, as there's no immediate panic since the feature has likely been "baked in" for some time. I want to avoid rushed migration risks.
For other cryptocurrencies that are not supported by Trezor*, I will unfortunately continue to use my Ledger. While unhappy about it, I acknowledge that I have no immediate alternative for those specific assets.
* I also use an air-gapped engraved wallet for some funds, which is even safer as it never physically connects to any other device.
Overall, I feel Ledger did not act in the best interest of its users by introducing this feature and by not being transparent about the hardware's capabilities from the start. My preference is for devices where the private key is always* held on the device, no matter what.
Transcript
This is really annoying, but if you own one of these devices, which is a Ledger Nano X, or you use Ledger products, you need to pay attention to what's happening right now, because it's been revealed that Ledger products may not be as safe as we originally thought it would be. Now, for all this to make sense, we need to have a base assumption. And that assumption was that the private key, the key that holds all our cryptocurrencies, that would never, ever, ever leave this device under no circum...